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This paper starts with a brief review of the UK Supreme Court’s decision in the Montgomery 
case. Although much of the focus in discussing the case has been on the disclosure of risk, an 
important aspect of the model of consent contained in the judgment is that of dialogue. The 
model of informed consent set out in Montgomery suggests shared decision-making as the 
norm. Central to shared decision-making, however, is an awareness of values and of how 
values can vary between people. We introduce values-based practice as an approach which is 
entirely in keeping with the precepts of the Montgomery judgment. We go on to review how 
values-based practice and shared decision-making are relevant to psychiatric practice, using 
as examples recovery practice and compulsory detention under the Mental Health Act 1983. 
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• Learn about the new legal test of consent established by the UK Supreme Court 
Montgomery ruling 
 
• Learn about the role of values-based practice as a partner to evidence-based practice 
in implementing Montgomery 
 
• Understand how values-based practice and Montgomery together support shared 









Select the single best option for each question stem 
1  The Bolam principle 
a has been reinforced by the Montgomery Supreme Court judgment  
b was originally formulated to test decision-making capacity 
c continues to be relevant as the applicable standard of care for technical aspects of diagnosis 
and treatment 
d is named after the English actor James Bolam 
e established shared decision-making among healthcare professionals 
2  The model of consent enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Montgomery decision  
a calls for a revision of General Medical Council guidance on consent  
b establishes that only common side effects of a treatment need to be disclosed to a patient  
c establishes that only serious side effects of a treatment need to be disclosed to a patient  
d establishes that both serious and common side effects of a treatment need to be disclosed to 
a patient 
e includes disclosure of benefits as well as risks by way of dialogue between the clinician and 
patient 
3 Values-based practice 
a requires complete agreement  
b at its base requires an awareness of values 
c provides a hierarchy of values to guide decision-making  
d privileges the values of a reasonable body of medical opinion 
e is the antithesis of evidence-based practice 
4 Recovery Practice 
a is compatible with values-based practice  
  
4 
b ensures that health professionals focus correctly on cure  
c depends on professional judgement to establish thresholds of disability  
d is incompatible with the treatment of chronic mental illness  
e is incompatible with shared decision-making 
5  The Montgomery judgment  
a concerned a schizophrenic patient in Broadmoor Hospital with a gangrenous leg 
b is less relevant to shared decision-making than the Sidaway case  
c is relevant even where the Mental Health Act has been used to detain someone against their 
wishes 
d establishes informed consent on the basis of the ruling of Lord Justice Montgomery  
e undermines clinical expertise 
 
MCQ answers 
1c  2e  3b  4a  5c 
 

















The Montgomery Ruling, Individual Values and Shared Decision-
Making in Psychiatry 
  
Introduction  
The last 30 years have witnessed the law on consent move progressively towards a patient-
focused approach. This shift, from paternalism to informed consent, is well documented by 
Rix (2017). The UK Supreme Court Montgomery ruling (Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health 
Board (Scotland) [2015] UKSC 11) consolidates this move, making what matters or is 
important from the perspective of the patient (i.e. patients’ values) central to consent. 
Montgomery however also incorporates other value perspectives including those of the 
clinician. The ruling thus makes shared decision-making between clinician and patient the 
basis of consent in clinical care. 
In this paper we: (1) describe the elements of consent as set out in Montgomery and how 
these reflect current GMC and related guidance on shared decision-making; (2) outline the 
skills and other elements of values-based practice that together with evidence-based practice 
support shared decision-making in clinical care; and (3) give examples of how Montgomery 
and values-based practice together support shared decision-making in psychiatry. 
1) The Montgomery Ruling  
The facts of the case in Montgomery are readily stated (see Rix 2017). Mrs Nadine 
Montgomery, who had diabetes, gave birth by vaginal delivery to a baby boy while under the 
care of an obstetrician, Dr McLellan. Sadly, her baby suffered severe birth trauma as a result 
of shoulder dystocia. This is a well-recognised complication of vaginal delivery in women 
with diabetes. Dr McLellan had, however, not warned Mrs Montgomery of this risk nor 
offered her the option of an elective caesarean section. Mrs Montgomery consequently sought 
damages in negligence. Two lower courts found against her citing the Bolam principle (see 
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Box 1). The Supreme Court reversed this decision allowing her appeal in their judgment 
delivered in March 2015.  
--- Box 1, Bolam and Montgomery, about here --- 
The Montgomery case has sparked a good deal of controversy, with legal experts calling into 
question ‘the competence of the courts to adjudicate on matters of clinical judgement’ 
(Montgomery and Montgomery 2016). Nonetheless, it remains true that the law requires what 
amounts to values-based shared decision-making as the basis of consent so that the values of 
all concerned should be heard and a true dialogue form the basis of consent. 
Four elements of the Montgomery model of consent 
Some commentaries have tended to focus on what Montgomery has to say about risk 
disclosure. This is important, but is only one of four key elements of its model of consent. We 
shall look briefly at each of these as summarized in Box 2 and then indicate how they come 
together in shared decision-making. 
--- Box 2, Four Elements of the Montgomery model of consent, about here --- 
Consent in Montgomery starts with disclosure of ‘material risks’. Under Bolam rules what is 
material is a matter primarily for professional judgement. This is why two lower courts 
rejected Mrs Montgomery’s claim for damages. In deciding against warning her patient about 
shoulder dystocia Dr McClelland, they concluded, had acted consistently with the practice of 
a body of her peers. The Montgomery judges however took a very different line. 
Contemporary standards of practice they argued (as represented in particular by GMC 
guidance, such as Good Medical Practice (GMC 2013)) demand an approach that defines the 
materiality of a risk from the perspective primarily not of the clinician but of the patient. 
They summarised their patient-focused test of materiality thus: 
‘The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, 
a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach 
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significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the 
particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it’ (paragraph 87). 
This is an important passage. But there is more to consent in Montgomery than just risk 
disclosure so defined. ‘It follows from this approach’, the Montgomery judges continue, that 
the materiality of a risk  
‘… is likely to reflect a variety of factors … for example … the importance 
to the patient of the benefits sought to be achieved by the treatment, the 
alternatives available, and the risks involved in those alternatives’ 
(paragraph 89, emphases added).  
This in turn means, they continue in the next paragraph, that the doctor’s role 
‘…involves dialogue, the aim of which is to ensure that the patient 
understands the seriousness of her condition, and the anticipated benefits and 
risks of the proposed treatment and any reasonable alternatives, so that she is 
then in a position to make an informed decision’ (paragraph 90, emphasis 
added).  
The model of consent thus defined is not a legal invention. The Montgomery judges based it 
on submissions by the GMC. They cite in particular GMC guidance on shared decision-
making as the basis of consent (GMC, 2008, para 5): 
‘“The doctor explains the options to the patient, setting out the potential 
benefits, risks, burdens and side effects of each option, including the option to 
have no treatment. … The patient weighs up the potential benefits, risks and 
burdens of the various options as well as any non-clinical issues that are 
relevant to them. The patient decides whether to accept any of the options 
and, if so, which one.” ’ (cited in Montgomery at para 78.)  
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Read in isolation this passage might suggest a consumerist model of consent in which (like a 
customer in the retail trade) “the patient is always right”. Montgomery, though again 
reflecting professional guidance, makes clear that this is not what is intended. The patient’s 
values (i.e. what matters or is important to the patient) are indeed at the heart of clinical 
decision-making in Montgomery. But in coming to a shared decision the patient’s values have 
to be weighed in the balance with a number of other values including those of the clinician.  
The importance of clinicians’ values in Montgomery is signaled first in a number of 
exceptions to the duty to disclose material risks. These are summarized in Box 3. Two of 
these exceptions (‘risk of harm’ and ‘necessity’) directly reflect the long established “primum 
non nocere” (first do no harm) principle of medical ethics.  
--- Box 3, Three exceptions to the duty to disclose risks, about here -- 
Montgomery further reflects medical values in restricting the options that the doctor is 
obliged to consider to those that are ‘reasonable’ (para 87). Options that are ‘futile or 
inappropriate’ (para 115) are thereby excluded. Just who decides what is futile or 
inappropriate is left unstated. But there is a clear commitment to the medical value of 
scientific evidence in the Montgomery judges appeal to evidence-based guidelines from the 
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (para 112) and from NICE (para 116). 
Still other balancing elements implicit in Montgomery include the values of other team 
members (para 75) and of the wider society as represented by health economic and other 
strategic values (para 75) bearing on the effective and equitable delivery of health care. 
The shared decision-making therefor underpinning consent in Montgomery depends on 
balancing what is important to the patient concerned as the primary value driving clinical 
decision-making against the values of the clinician and others. The patient, as the 
Montgomery judges put it, is entitled to have their values ‘take(n) into account’ (para 115). 
Taken into account, then, weighed in the balance, no more. But also no less – it was precisely 
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because Mrs Montgomery’s values were not taken into account that the Montgomery judges 
overturned the findings of two lower courts and allowed her appeal. So there is a balance to 
be struck. This is where values-based practice has a role to play. 
2) Values-based Practice  
Values-based practice is one of a number of approaches (including ethics and health 
economics) developed in recent years to support working with values in healthcare. Values-
based practice adds to these a skills-based approach to balanced decision-making within 
frameworks of shared values.  
Like evidence-based practice values-based practice recognizes that 
Values + Evidence = Shared Clinical Decision-Making 
Values-based practice is thus a partner to evidence-based practice (Fulford 2011). Evidence-
based practice offers a process that balances complex and conflicting evidence as it bears on 
clinical decision-making. Values-based practice offers a counterpart balancing process for 
values.  
The process of values-based practice is shown diagrammatically in Box 4.  
---- Box 4: a Diagram of values-based practice, about here ---- 
With its aim of balanced decision-making, values-based practice supports the balanced 
decision-making required by Montgomery. Note in Box 4 that the decisions may be 
dissensual because it will not always be possible to reach a consensus, yet conflicting values 
remain relevant: “differences of values, instead of being resolved, remain in play to be 
balanced according to the circumstances presented by particular decisions” (Fulford 2012, p. 
32; and see Fulford 2012, pp. 165-182 for further discussion of “dissensus”). Dissensus, then, 
does not preclude the possibility of consensus about shared values, but allows the possibility 
of a balanced approach to working together even where values are in conflict (Fulford 1998). 
Box 5 sets out the process elements of values-based practice mentioned in Box 4. They are 
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further described in Fulford (2004) and Fulford (2012). 
---- Box 5. The process elements of values-based practice about here ---- 
In the rest of this section we illustrate how values-based practice supports shared decision-
making with a worked example of a training exercise used to develop one of its four skills 
areas, raised awareness of individual values.  
If you want to learn more about values-based practice a comprehensive reading guide 
including self-training and other resources is available at: http://valuesbasedpractice.org. 
A worked example 
Raised awareness is the starting point for all values-based training. Our natural tendency is to 
assume that we understand each other’s values. But all too often we are wrong. So it is 
important clinically to find out what is important to our patients. Otherwise we will not be in 
a position to ‘take into account’ our patients’ values in the process of shared decision-making 
required by Montgomery.  
---- Box 6. Forced Choice Exercise, about here ---- 
The exercise shown in Box 6 is a forced choice exercise. You may want to try this before 
reading on. Like other skills-based areas of medicine, values-based practice is better 
understood by trying it for yourself rather than just reading about it.  
Mostly people don’t find it easy! This is part of the message. But the main message is in the 
extraordinary range of answers people give. The range shown in Figure 1 is from a seminar 
with a group of clinicians; but the range is typical. Just twenty-five people’s answers range 
from under six months to over eighty years. In training sessions people are often really 
surprised by the answers that other group members – even people who know each other well 
(Handa 2016) - come up with. If you tried the exercise where did your answer come? Think 
about why you chose the period you did and why others choose very different periods.  
---- Figure 1. Results of a Forced Choice Exercise, about here ---- 
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In plenary discussion, groups quickly came to see that their wide range of answers reflects a 
correspondingly wide range of their individual values. For some people what is important is 
to complete a key project (a PhD for example): so their minimum period might be quite short 
(under six months in this case). For people with young families, on the other hand, their 
priority is to last long enough to see their children safely grown up: so they might need a 
minimum of ten or more years. Still other people opt for the 50:50 ‘kill or cure’ option 
regardless. Two people in this group said they would ‘want it over with’ rather than facing a 
definite date of death however far away.  
The messages then are that, yes, our individual values really are very different one from 
another, and no, we can’t assume we know what matters even to people we know well (let 
alone therefor the patient we met for the first time a few minutes ago). All this in turn plays 
out in clinical decision-making. In this forced choice exercise everyone has the same 
evidence-base. They have indeed an artificially simple evidence base. Usually the evidence is 
more complex and ambiguous than in the imaginary scenario in the exercise. Also, equivalent 
choices made for real are that much more challenging for being emotively charged. Yet this is 
what is demanded of patients in the shared clinical decision-making required by Montgomery.  
Raising awareness, as we have indicated, is only the start. But it is a useful start clinically. In 
the next section we look at how values-based practice in raising awareness of differences of 
individual values, supports shared decision-making in psychiatry. We consider two examples, 
recovery practice and compulsory treatment, representing contrasting balances of values.  
3) Shared Decision-making in Psychiatry  
Psychiatry shares with the rest of medicine the principles of shared values-based decision-
making underpinning consent mandated by Montgomery. Good Psychiatric Practice (Royal 
College of Psychiatrists 2009) mirrors in this respect the GMC guidance on which the 
Montgomery judges relied (see Rix 2017 for details). The College’s Code of Ethics (Royal 
  
12 
College of Psychiatrists 2014), similarly, directly reflects the elements of the Montgomery 
approach to consent: it emphasizes the importance of ‘partnership’ in decision-making 
(Principle 5.1) based on the ‘sharing of … understandable information’ (Principle 5.3) about 
‘the full range of available treatment options [and] the advantages and disadvantages of 
each…’ (Principle 6.1).  
But there is a marked gap between theory and practice:  
‘…the accounts of people using mental health services, along with observations and 
surveys of psychiatric practice, all suggest that [shared decision-making] is not fully 
implemented, with psychiatrists often using persuasion to improve adherence. …’ 
(Baker 2013).  
There is a similar gap between theory and practice with decisions about ‘place of residence’ 
for people with dementia admitted to medical wards (Emmett 2013) and, in part, this directly 
reflects the varied values that can be at play in such decision-making (Greener 2012). 
One reason for these gaps is that psychiatry raises particularly acute challenges of balancing 
values (Fulford 1989). This is why the need for values-based practice has been recognized for 
example in forensic psychiatry (Adshead 2009). But that the challenges are generic is 
illustrated by the role of shared decision-making in recovery practice.  
Recovery Practice 
The importance of values in recovery practice in psychiatry has been widely recognised for 
some time (Anthony 1993; Baker 2013). ‘Recovery’ in this context means shifting the focus 
of treatment from the professional’s concern with symptom control to recovery of a good 
quality of life as defined from the perspective of the individual patient concerned (Allott 
2002). Whilst ‘recovery’ is a contested notion, it can be linked to experiences of inequality 
and injustice (Harper and Speed 2012), which are likely to be mitigated by an appreciation of 
the validity of different values if this produces genuinely shared decision-making. 
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This is a shift of values therefor. Recovery practice involves a shift in focus from what is 
important from the perspective of the professional to what is important from the perspective 
of the patient. This shift can be difficult to put into practice, partly it seems because 
clinicians’ values may differ from those of patients, as shown by Thornicroft et al. (2013), 
where implementing joint decision-making in practice was hard to achieve. As already 
indicated, individual values are highly variable. But epidemiological and other research 
suggests that where professionals are by and large concerned with such issues as diagnosis, 
symptom control and risk management, patients (particularly with long-term complex 
conditions) are more concerned with housing, employment and personal relationships. 
Recognizing these differences therefor and developing the further values-based skills to work 
with them successfully is a key to recovery practice (Boardman 2010). Importantly, this may 
involve other members of the multidisciplinary team – such as nurses and social workers – 
whose values may be different again. So the skills needed for values-based interprofessional 
care may also be important to recovery practice.  
This is why values-based practice has for some time been a core theme in recovery (Roberts 
2008; Slade 2009). Montgomery indeed makes, what is in all but name, recovery practice the 
basis of consent in psychiatry. The challenge though in Montgomery, as in recovery practice, 
is that the shift of values underpinning both is not absolute. It is a shift only in the balance of 
values. This may be challenging enough in recovery practice (as with ‘positive risk 
management’ for example (Robertson and Collinson 2011)). It becomes critical with 
compulsory treatment.  
Compulsory treatment  
The connections between the Montgomery ruling and mental health legislation have yet to be 
tested through the courts. There is after all something of a contradiction in the idea of 
applying standards of legal consent to non-consensual treatment! But as things stand it seems 
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likely that Montgomery applies to any capacitous patient whether treated under the (non-
capacity based) Mental Health Act (MHA) or not. Moreover, consent is required for certain 
types of treatment for mental disorder administered under Part IV of the MHA: 
psychosurgery under section 57, administration of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) to 
capacitated patient under section 58A and, under section 58, prolonged medication when the 
patient has capacity. So Montgomery has an important role to play in these situations. This is 
emphasized by the MHA Code of Practice (Department of Health 2015) which deals with the 
provision of information between paragraphs 24.36 to 24.39. For instance, 
‘The information which should be given should be related to the particular patient, the 
particular treatment and relevant clinical knowledge and practice. In every case, 
sufficient information should be given to the patient to ensure that they understand in 
broad terms the nature, likely effects and all significant possible adverse outcomes of 
that treatment, including the likelihood of its success and any alternatives to it’ (MHA 
Code of Practice, paragraph 24.37). 
However, even when compulsory treatment is administered under section 63 (Treatment not 
requiring consent), the Code at paragraph 24.41 stipulates that the patient’s consent should 
still be sought ‘where practicable’, suggesting that the Montgomery ruling should be relevant 
and reflected in good psychiatric practice (and see Yousif 2016).  
Montgomery thus requires a balance of values with non-consensual compulsory treatment (of 
a capacitous patient) under the MHA just as it does with consensual treatment (of a 
capacitous patient) in recovery practice. Non-consensual treatment decisions are by definition 
not based on agreement between clinician and patient. But using a values-based approach 
they may nonetheless be shared decisions in being made within a framework of shared 
values. The MHA moreover comes with an in-built framework of shared values provided by 
the Guiding Principles in the Code of Practice (Department of Health 2015). These principles 
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directly reflect the Montgomery requirement that the patient’s values should be at the heart of 
decision-making. They include: 
• The need for independence and the promotion of recovery (1st Principle); 
• Participation and involvement (2nd Principle); 
• Recognizing and respecting ‘the diverse needs, values and circumstances of each 
patient’ (3rd Principle); 
• The purpose of treatment being to address the individual patient’s needs, ‘taking into 
account their circumstances and preferences where appropriate’ (4th Principle); 
• Recognizing ‘as far as practicable … the patient’s wishes’ (5th Principle) (DoH 2015, 
pp.23-25). 
Training materials based on the Guiding Principles developed by the Department of Health to 
support implementation of the Act had the aim of limiting the use of compulsory treatment 
(Fulford and King 2008). Since implementation, however, there has been growing concern 
that the number of detained patients has actually risen with potentially adverse effects on 
clinical outcomes (House of Commons Health Committee 2013). One explanation for this 
rise in compulsory treatment is that concerns about safety have in practice outweighed the 
patient-focused values expressed in the Guiding Principles (Fulford 2015). Meanwhile, there 
is evidence that advance statements lead to ‘a statistically significant and clinically relevant 
23% reduction in compulsory admissions in adult psychiatric patients’ (de Jong 2016), 
suggesting that acknowledging the patient’s views and values is beneficial. Applying 
Montgomery therefor to compulsory treatment, supported by a values-based approach to 
balanced decision-making within the Guiding Principles, could help to reduce use of 
compulsion and thereby improve clinical outcomes.  
In any case, Montgomery argues powerfully in favour of a manner of approach to patients. 
Patients are seen as persons with rights and values, which must be acknowledged and 
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respected. On the one hand, therefore, practitioners should be willing to accept some risks in 
order to respect (as Lady Hale in Montgomery described it) “a person’s interest in their own 
physical and psychiatric integrity, an important feature of which is their autonomy, their 
freedom to decide what shall and shall not be done with their body” (paragraph 108). Taken 
seriously this might even lower the tendency to instigate treatment under compulsion. On the 
other hand, even if compulsory treatment is given, it should be given with as little restraint 
and with as much real respect as possible. 
Conclusions  
In this article, we have described the new legal standard of care in consent set out in the 
recent Supreme Court Montgomery ruling, indicated how the balanced value judgments it 
requires are supported by raised awareness of individual values and other elements of values-
based practice, and given examples of how Montgomery and values-based practice together 
support shared decision-making in psychiatric practice (Coulter and Collins 2011).  
Psychiatry, like other areas of medicine, is caught between the twin pressures of ever-
growing demands and ever-shrinking resources. The focus in early commentaries on the new 
duty to disclose material risks imposed by Montgomery understandably led to concerns that 
this would add to these pressures. Understood rather as we have presented it here, as 
requiring partnership in clinical decision-making, Montgomery, far from adding to the 
pressures of practice, becomes an ally to professionals and patients alike in seeking the 









Box 1. Bolam and Montgomery  
The Bolam principle is a rule for assessing the legal standard of care in negligence cases 
involving professionals.  It says that a doctor (or other skilled professional) will not be held 
negligent so long as they act in accordance with the practice of a responsible and skilled body 
of their professional peers (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 
582, 587). Bolam was applied in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal 
Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871 as the applicable standard of care in 
relation to a doctor’s duty to inform in medical treatment cases. Montgomery overturned 
Sidaway but left Bolam otherwise intact. This means that the Bolam test continues as the test 
for the appropriate standard of care in negligence for technical aspects of diagnosis and 






Box 2.  Four elements of the Montgomery model of consent 
1) Disclosure of material risks 
2) Disclosure of benefits as well as risks  
3) Disclosure of risks and benefits not just for the target intervention being considered but for 
any reasonable alternatives that may be available  






Box 3. Three exceptions to the duty to disclose risks 
Montgomery follows precedent in recognizing three exceptions to the duty to disclose: 
1. Opting out: the patient does not wish to know about risks (but, even then, the GMC says 
that doctors should try to give basic information and must explain the potential consequences 
of not having the relevant information) (GMC 2008, paragraphs 13-15).  
2. Risk of harm: there is a risk of serious harm should the patient be informed. But the GMC 
adds: “‘serious harm’ means more than that the patient might become upset or decide to 
refuse treatment” (GMC 2008, paragraph 16); and Montgomery warns that the “therapeutic 
exception” should be exceptional. 
3. Necessity: in an emergency, the doctrine of necessity applies, for example if the patient is 
‘unconscious or otherwise unable to make a decision.’ (Montgomery paragraph 88). 
  
 
Box 4. A Diagram of the Process of Values-Based Practice 
Ten Key Process Elements 
• 4 Clinical Skills  
• 2 Aspects of clinical 
relationships 
• 3 Principles linking VBP and 
EBP 
• Partnership in decision-
making 
Together these 
 support  
 
 
Balanced dissensual decisions 









Box 5. The process elements of values-based practice 
(see Fulford 2004 and 2012) 
Clinical Skills 
1. Awareness of values  
2. Reasoning about values  
3. Knowledge of values  
4. Communication skills  
Professional relationships 
5. Person-values-centered practice  
6. Extended multidisciplinary team work  
Evidence-based Practice and Values-based Practice 
7. The two feet principle: all decisions are based on both values and evidence 
8. The squeaky wheel principle: values are only noticed when they cause problems 
9. The science-driven principle: as science and technology advance new and diverse 
values emerge driving the need for attention to the evidence and the facts 
10. Partnership: consensus and dissensus 
 
Box 6. Forced Choice Exercise 
Imagine you have developed early symptoms of a potentially fatal disease. 
There are two possible evidence-based treatments both of which offer advantages but 
neither of which is perfect: 
~TREATMENT A - gives you a guaranteed period of remission but no cure 
~TREATMENT B - gives you a 50:50 chance of ‘kill or cure’ 
It’s your decision – what is the minimum period of remission you would want from 
Treatment A to choose that treatment rather than choosing the 50:50 ‘kill or cure’ 
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